The Steward-Turned-Spy

Disunion follows the Civil War as it unfolded.

During the last weeks of March 1862 some 121,000 troops from the Army of the Potomac — the Union’s largest military force — began arriving on the Virginia Peninsula, the first step in what Northerners hoped would be a successful jab at Richmond, the Confederate capital. For over three weeks, hundreds of boats transported the men, 14,000 horses and incalculable tons of matériel southward down the Chesapeake Bay to Union-held Fort Monroe on the peninsula’s tip.

The colossal amphibious movement was carried out with well-designed efficiency and seemed to spell impending doom for Richmond, and possibly the end of the war. Though the strategy was Gen. George B. McClellan’s, the troops were there largely because of a free black man named William Ringgold.

Ringgold’s story began on April 23, 1861, less than two weeks after the firing on Fort Sumter, when the steamship Logan left Baltimore for Fredericksburg, Va. Ringgold, working as a steward, was aboard. As soon as the ship reached its goal, Ringgold, the Logan and its crew were impressed into service by Virginia — which, newly at war, was frantically preparing defenses against invasion. The need for labor was overwhelming: volunteer soldiers had to spend their time drilling, and thus thousands of African- Americans were forced into service digging trenches to prepare against a possible attack up the peninsula from Fort Monroe. By fall of 1861 the Confederates had a solid network of defenses.

By then Northern troops had been soundly whipped at Bull Run, and President Lincoln had placed Gen. George B. McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac. Though McClellan was accused of having no plan of action, and was widely suspected of being pro-slavery, he was formulating a rather bold strategy for capturing the Confederate capital. Instead of driving his army directly south from Washington, he envisioned using the Chesapeake Bay to bypass the South’s well-placed entrenchments in northern Virginia, then disembarking his troops somewhere east and possibly south of Richmond.

While McClellan was putting together his plan, Ringgold’s service came to a surprising end. The Logan and its crew had been busy moving laborers and troops, but on Oct. 22 a storm had swept through the Virginia Tidewater, damaging the ship and putting it out of service. Ringgold and his crewmates were then discharged, and they traveled to Richmond to be paid. While there, Ringgold observed Confederates forcing more than 700 free blacks and 2,000 slaves to labor on defensive works around the city. Everywhere Ringgold traveled, the Rebels were making great effort to protect Virginia from invasion — with the noticeable exceptions of West Point, on the northern side of the peninsula, and the York River railroad. There seemed to be no artillery positions protecting either, and only a few troops guarding the railroad’s bridges.

Once paid, it was time to go home. Ringgold and two of his crewmates managed to get passes providing unmolested travel to the Eastern Shore of Virginia (apparently the three seemed harmless enough). The weary band then set off on the river and crossed the enormous Chesapeake Bay in a canoe. This feat alone was impressive, but upon reaching Cherrystone Creek on the Eastern Shore they made their way over 200 miles on foot back to Baltimore, reaching their hometown on Nov. 14.

Sometime within the next two weeks, Ringgold apparently decided that the Northern Army might be interested in what he knew about Virginia, and he obtained an audience with Gen. John A. Dix. A former secretary of the Treasury under James Buchanan, Dix was a primary reason that Maryland was still in the Union: as head of the military Department of Maryland, he used his power to prevent the state’s legislature from meeting and thereby kept it from voting to secede. After talking to Ringgold, the crafty officer realized what Confederate authorities apparently did not: The free black man held detailed and valuable knowledge about Rebel dispositions in Virginia.

Library of Congress Allan Pinkerton, ca. 1861

Dix quickly sent Ringgold to Allan Pinkerton, the famous spy who was working as McClellan’s head of intelligence. Pinkerton interviewed Ringgold on Dec. 2 and, like Dix, was impressed with his intelligence and his detailed information. Ringgold identified Southern regiments and their positions on the lower peninsula, described the formidable river batteries at Gloucester and Yorktown and explained that there were no other artillery positions farther west up the river all the way to West Point. Most important, Ringgold’s information painted West Point and the York River railroad as lightly defended prizes.

If an army could land by water at Urbanna, on the north side of the Middle Peninsula (which sits north across the York River from the Virginia Peninsula) they would face only an 18-mile march to West Point, as opposed to 50 if they tramped up the Virginia Peninsula from Fort Monroe. From there they could use the undefended railroad to deliver heavy siege artillery right to the outskirts of Richmond.

Pinkerton obtained other information about the region, but Ringgold’s was the most detailed, and it undeniably played an important role in McClellan’s choice in landing spots for his grand campaign. Soon after receiving Pinkerton’s report, the general settled on a route from Urbanna to West Point and then on the York River railroad as the best path to the rebel capital.

However, as a backup plan, McClellan considered taking his army farther south, to Fort Monroe. This would require dealing with the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, as well as the rebel trenches on the peninsula. But once those obstacles were overcome, the York River would be open all the way to West Point, thus the army could still easily take the landings there and use the York River railroad for the final push.

The Ringgold-inspired plan was in the works until, a few weeks before the attack, the Confederates withdrew from their Manassas entrenchments, re-concentrating farther south along the Rappahannock River. McClellan feared this indicated that his plan for landing at Urbanna had been discovered, so he settled on his backup. Because the first choice had not been to land at Fort Monroe, Pinkerton and McClellan unfortunately failed to get much new information about the lower peninsula. While Ringgold’s information about the river batteries, West Point, and the York River railroad was still accurate, his details about the Peninsula’s defenses were now dated and incomplete. Soon, McClellan faced more extensive fortifications on the peninsula than he had anticipated.

Ringgold wasn’t alone in providing critical information to McClellan — all through the peninsula campaign, free blacks and former slaves alike brought him vital details about Southern defenses and troop movements. At the same time, however, Northerners also grew frustrated by the fact that their army had to contend with Rebel fortifications constructed by impressed slave laborers. McClellan believed the war could be won without emancipating the slaves, but his campaign soon caused many Northerners to wonder otherwise.

Sources: Allan Pinkerton to George McClellan, Dec. 2, 1861, George B. McClellan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscripts Division; War Department, “The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies”; Edwin C. Fishel, “The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War”; Stephen W. Sears, “To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign.”